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Tedwyn, and Robert, who will always have
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Feinberg argues that although animals have rights, the
rights position is consistent with holding "that an
individual human life as such is a thing of far greater
value than an individual animal life as such."2 This view
is also shared by those who work outside the rights
paradigm; indeed, one of the few points of similarity
between Regan's rights theory and the utilitarian theory
of Peter Singer is that although both rely heavily on
normative notions of equality, both appeal to the notion
that some beings have qualitatively different and
ultimately more valuable experience for purposes of
resolving conflicts between beings who have moral
standing. For example, Singer argues that "we can make
sense of the idea that the life of one kind of animal
possesses greater value than the life of another; and if
this is so, then the claim that the life of every being has
equal value is on very weak ground."3
Reliance on notions of comparable value and harm
by Regan, Feinberg, and Singer has occasioned critical
reactions by friend and foe alike. For example,
philosopher S. F. Sapontzis, who argues in favor of
including animals as members of the moral community,
takes issue with the hierarchical status of humans
implied by the notion of comparable harm. Humans
undoubtedly can experience things that animals cannot,
but the opposite is true as well: "We cannot enjoy the
life of a dog, a bird, a bat, or a dolphin."4 Accordingly,
we cannot use species alone to make judgments of

Introduction
In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan posits the
following hypothetical: five survivors-four normal
adults and one normal dog-are on a lifeboat. There is
room in the boat only for four, and one of the occupants
must be thrown overboard. Regan maintains that his
rights theory provides an answer to the problem.
Although death is a harm for the dog, Regan argues,
death would be a qualitatively greater loss, and,
accordingly, a greater harm, for any of the humans: "To
throw anyone of the humans overboard, to face certain
death, would be to make that individual worse-off (Le.,
would cause tlult individual a greater harm) than the
harm that would be done to the dog if the animal was
thrown overboard.") It would, on Regan's view, be
morally obligatory to kill the dog. Further, Regan
claims even if the choice is between a million dogs
and one person, it would still be obligatory under rights
theory to throw the dogs overboard.
This notion of comparable harm is not unique to
Regan although different theorists use it in different
ways. Other theorists who subscribe to some version
of animal rights share Regan's view. For example, Joel
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relative harm to resolve conflicts between humans and
nonhumans without being guilty of the very speciesism
that is the foundation of animal exploitation.
Peter Carruthers, who rejects the moral standing of
animals, similarly bases his argument in very large part
on Regan's and Singer's willingness to argue that human
experience is such that humans generally suffer greater
harm than do animals when humans are foreclosed from
satisfying opportunities. Carruthers argues that we have
a common-sense moral view that human life cannot be
weighed against animal life that is so strong that even
Regan and Singer affirm the validity of this view.
Carruthers maintains that the moral theory that is most
comfortably consistent with this common-sense view
is some form of contractualism that would exclude
animals from the moral community because animals
are not rational agents. 5
Ironically, one of Regan's most vocal critics is
Singer, who claims that a "theory that tells us that all
subjects-of-a-life (including dogs) have equal inherent
value [cannot] be reconciled with the intuition that it
is the dog that must be sacrificed."6 Singer argues that
because Regan maintains that, in the lifeboat example,
his theory would allow for the killing of a million dogs
as well, Regan's theory would permit more animal use
than Singer explicitly acknowledges would be permitted
at least in theory under utilitarianism. Singer denies that
individual capacities (intelligence, awareness) playa
role in his assessments about the morality of imposing
pain on animals although Singer's construction of
"interests" is heavily dependent on those capacities.
Singer thinks that dependence on these capacities may
cut in favor of the animal (Le., we ought to attach
greater interest to the animal's interest in avoiding
pain or suffering because tile animal may feel greater
fear than a human because of different cognitive
capacities), but that is irrelevant. The point is that
whether it does cut in favor of the animal or not is an
empirical question, and Singer's theory allows for those
capacities to matter and cannot delimit only those whose
application will favor nonhumans. Singer explicitly
relies on capacities in resolving issues about the morality
of killing animals. This leads him to the view that since
most farm animals, in Singer's view, are incapable
cognitively of grasping that they have a "life," they
can be consumed by humans if they are raised entirely
outside of the practices known collectively as "factory
farming" or as "intensive agriculture," and if they are
slaughtered painlessly. 7
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The use of comparable harm analysis presents
serious difficulties for any theory that seeks to expand
in any significant way the protection accorded to
nonhumans. These difficulties affect both deontological
and consequentialist theories (albeit in different ways).
I will, for the most part, confine my remarks to Regan's
theory in which the notion of comparable harm is
central. I will first set out the context in which Regan
develops his views on comparable harm. I will then
explore the implications of the notion of comparable
harm for rights theory. I will argue that Regan's
resolution of the lifeboat example is inconsistent with
a radical egalitarian theory, but I will suggest a reading
of Regan's theory that places the lifeboat example in a
different theoretical context.

Equal Inherent Value and Comparable Harm
The central part of Regan's rights argument begins with
his introduction of the postulate that moral agents have
a distinct moral value-inherent value-that is separate
from any intrinsic value such as pleasure or preference
satisfaction. This notion of inherent value is presented
by Regan as the primary alternative to the utilitarian
notion that individuals are receptacles whose value may
be determined by aggregating the intrinsic value that
attaches to their experience. Inherent value is also an
alternative to perfectionist ethics. Moral agents with
inherent value must possess that value equally or else
the notion of inherent value may collapse into one of
the "pernicious"g perfectionist theories of justice
"according to which what individuals are due, as a
matter of justice, depends on the degree to which they
possess a certain cluster of virtues or excellences,
including intellectual and artistic talents and a character
that expresses itself in the performance of heroic or
magnificent deeds."9 Perfectionist theories are
objectionable not only because they provide the
"foundation of the most objectionable forms of social,
political, and legal discrimination" but also because
"[w]hether individuals have the talent necessary to
acquire the favored virtues (e.g., ability to do higher
mathematics) is beyond their control."lO
The attribution of equal inherent value to at least
some moral patients (all normal manlffials aged one year
or more) is required because both agents and patients
are subjects-of-a-life; that is, agents and patients are
conscious, and possess a complex awareness (including
beliefs and desires and an ability to pursue and satisfy
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them) and psychophysical identity over time. Agents
and patients may be harmed or benefited and have a
welfare in that their experiential life fares well or ill for
them, independently of the utility that they have for
others or the interest that others have in them. Being a
subject-of-a-life is not only a sufficient condition for
having inherent value but is also a criterion that allows
for the intelligible and nonarbitrary attribution of equal
inherent value to moral agents and moral patients,
including nonhumans. Regan stresses that there is no
nonarbitrary way to separate moral agents from moral
patients and that there is no nonarbitrary way of
differentiating nonhuman moral patients from their
human counterparts.
Regan's respect principle, a predistributive formal
principle, requires that we treat those who have inherent
value in ways that respect that value and holds that no
individual with inherent value may be treated solely as
a means to an end in order to maximize the aggregate
of desirable consequences. From the respect principle
we may derive the harm principle, which holds that, as
a primafacie matter, harming the interests of a subjectof-a-life is showing disrespect for the inherent value of
the moral agent or patient. In light of the prima facie
nature of the obligations imposed by the harm principle,
it is necessary to determine under what circumstances
inflicting harm on moral agents or patients will be
permitted. It is in this context that the notion of
comparable harm becomes relevant.
Regan distinguishes two types of harm: harms that
are inflictions and harms that are deprivations. "Acute
or chronic physical or psychological suffering is the
paradigm of a harm understood as an infliction."1l
Deprivations involve" losses of those benefits that make
possible or enlarge the sources of satisfaction in life."12
According to Regan, "whatever the category, not all
harms are equal."13 Harms are comparable "when they
detract equally from an individual's welfare, or from
the welfare of two or more individuals."14 Similarly,
harms may not be comparable in those instances in
which there are differential effects on the welfare of
morally relevant beings. Although we may assume that
there is a "strong presumption" that "like harms have
like effect," the realities of individual variability
require recognition that like harm may detract
differently from individual welfare and may not be
counted as comparable.J5
1bis notion of comparable harm is the foundation
for the two general principles that Regan uses to resolve
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conflicts. The "miniride" principle, which assumes that
the morally innocent individuals involved will be harmed
in a prima facie comparable way, holds that in such
situations (and in the absence of special considerations)
we should choose to override the rights of the few rather
than to override the rights of the many.16 The "worseoff' principle, which assumes that the morally innocent
individuals involved will suffer non-comparable harm,
holds that in such situations (and in the absence ofspecial
considerations) we should choose to override the rights
of the many when the "harm faced by the few would
make them worse off than any of the many would be if
any other option were chosen."I?
So, the notion of comparable harm (and its related
concepts) plays a significant role in Regan's theory,
since it specifies the circumstances under which harm
may be inflicted on subjects-of-a-life, all of whom
possess equal inherent value. In this context, Regan
discusses the admittedly exceptional case of the four
humans and the dog (or a million dogs) in the lifeboat.
The dog has inherent value; indeed, according to
Regan, the dog has inherent value that is equal to that
possessed by her human co-passengers. Both the dog
and the humans have a prima facie right not to be
harmed. The decision to throw the dog overboard is
not speciesist, Regan argues, because the decision to
sacrifice the dog is not based on species membership
but rather, "on assessing the losses each individual faces
and assessing these losses equitably."18 There is no
aggregating of harms in that the rights view would
require throwing one million dogs overboard to save
the four humans. Although the dogs are subordinated
to the humans, this does not mean that there should be
any "routine subordination of the less virtuous by those
who are more virtuous, so that the latter may develop
their virtues optimally. The rights view disallows such
subordination."19 The lifeboat case is an exceptional
case and "what the rights view implies should be done
in exceptional cases... cannot fairly be generalized to
unexceptional cases."20
Harm as an Empirical Matter, "Routine"
Subordination, and the ''Exceptional'' Case
From the above description of certain aspects of Regan's
theory, it is clear that Regan very explicitly rejects any
sort of perfectionism in favor of radical egalitarianism.
Regan's postulate of equal inherent value is, according
to Regan's own description, "categorical" and
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perfectionist ethical theories would permit "the routine
subordination of the less virtuous by those who are more
virtuous."26 Third, he argues that "prevention cases,
including lifeboat cases, are exceptional cases:>27
I want to discuss briefly the empirical nature of
harm determinations, the notion of "routine"
subordination, and the problem of identifying
"exceptional" circumstances.

"admitting of no degrees."21 That is, Regan rejects the
notion that individuals can have different degrees of
inherent value: "If moral agents are viewed as having
inherent value to varying degrees, then there would have
to be some basis for determining how much inherent
value any given moral agent has."22 A theory of differing
levels of inherent value would risk reliance on some
version of perfectionism, which Regan rejects.
In addition, the attribution of equal inherent value
to moral agents and moral patients alike rests on the
notion of the subject-of-a-life, which Regan also
recognizes as categorical. 23 Indeed, the concept must
be categorical; if beings could possess status as a
subject-of-a-life to varying degrees, then it might be
possible that only moral agents-and not moral
patients-would have that status. But Regan rejects
this notion in favor of an egalitarian criterion that "does
not assert or imply that those who meet it have the
status of subject of a life to a greater or lesser degree,
depending on the degree to which they have or lack
some favored ability or virtue (e.g., the ability for
higher mathematics or those virtues associated with
artistic excellence). One either is a subject of a life, in
the sense explained, or one is not. All those who are,
are so equally."24
In order to be a subject-of-a-life, a being need only
be sentient, possess beliefs and desires (and an ability
to act in pursuit of desires and goals), perception,
memory, a psychophysical identity over time, emotional
life, and experiential welfare that is better or worse
depending on what happens to that being. Because both
moral agents and moral patients are subjects-of-a-life
"one cannot nonarbitrarily maintain that how much
inherent value moral agents have depends on the degrees
to which they possess the virtues in question or on how
much utility for others they have,"25
Although both equal inherent value and the criterion
used to attribute that value to moral agents and moral
patients are categorical, the concept of harm apparently
is not categorical, in that Regan allows supposed
differences between humans and nonhumans to rebut
the "strong presumption" that "like harms have like
effects." As between the human and nonhuman
occupants of the lifeboat, the same harm is deemed to
be qualitatively different. Regan defends his theory of
comparable harm in three ways. First, he maintains that
there is, as an empirical matter, a difference between
the harm suffered by the human and the same harm
suffered by a nonhuman. Second, he argues that
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(a) harm as an empirical matter
Regan regards both the postulate of equal inherent value
and the criterion used to attribute that value to moral
agents and patients (all subjects-of-a-life) as categorical
and admitting of no degrees whatsoever. Harm,
however, is different Although there is obvious overlap,
we can, as an empirical matter, identify at least two
types of harm-inflictions and deprivations-and we
may, also as an empirical matter, judge that different
rightholders may be affected in different ways by the
same type of harm.
The problem with regarding harm as an empirical
matter is that it involves a different analysis from that
involved in the formulation of Regan's theoretical
postulates. Not only is it difficult as an empirical matter
to make some of the assessments that need to be made
to compare harms, but, more important, any such
consideration of supposed empirical facts about harm
in this regard is inconsistent with what it is necessary
to disregard in the formulation of those theoretical
postulates. Regan carefully constructs his postulate of
equal inherent value so that it excludes any notion of
individual characteristics or what may be thought to be
virtues in a perfectionist theory. Similarly, his subjectof-a-life criterion similarly excludes any notion of
individual characteristic or virtue apart from those
characteristics-sentience, beliefs, desires, psychophysical identity over time-that are constitutive of
subject-of-a-life status. In light of the obvious empirical
differences among human beings, and between humans
and animals, Regan could have developed a concept of
"subject" that reflected those differences. But he
avoided these characteristics in favor of categorical
theoretical notions that disregarded as irrelevant the
existence of these empirical differences.
If the status of being a subject-of-a-life is, as Regan
argues, an all-or-nothing proposition, then all such
subjects must be equal for purposes of deciding at least
those conflicts that involve interests protected under
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Regan argues that even in the lifeboat case, the
decision to kill the dog is not based on any appeal to
perfectionist theories but, rather, is based on consideration of the equal inherent value and equal prima
facie right not to be harmed. Although Regan may be
correct to argue that his resolution of the lifeboat
example does not appeal explicitly to perfectionism
as advocating the routine subordination of rightholders, his resolution does appeal to a supposed
human "excellence" (the ability to pursue opportunities for satisfaction). But to say that this virtue
may be appealed to only in exceptional cases is
nevertheless to say that in that class ofcases, there is
routine subordination based on a supposed virtue
possessed by one class of rightholders.

the rights theory. If all rightholders have inherent value
because to accord them differential value would lead
to perfectionism, and if moral agents and patients alike
have this equal value because to accord them differential
value would lead to perfectionism, then accepting a
theory of comparable harm based at least in part on the
presence or absence of certain virtues may be the same
as arguing that the being who is harmed less has an
inherent value that is different from, and less than, the
one harmed more. Indeed, in Singer's theory, the
different quality of experience is used primarily to
determine relative value of different beings and not to
differentiate the varying degrees of harm suffered by
beings with the same inherent value. 28

(b) "routine" subordination
(c) "exceptional" circumstances
Part of the difficulty surrounding the notion of
comparable harm is related to ambiguity involving
precisely what constitutes "routine" subordination and
when we have an "exceptional" case. When Regan says
that the lifeboat example does not involve the "routine"
subordination of one subject of a life to another, he
means that the principle that we should favor humans
over the dog is not one that we should apply save in
"exceptional" circumstances. A routine subordination
in unexceptional cases would likely represent some
form of perfectionism. Indeed, Regan argues that the
postulate of equal inherent value is acceptable because
it avoids the "wildly inegalitarian implications of
perfectionist theories."29 Moreover, Regan rejects any
attempt to argue that moral patients (including
nonhumans) have less inherent value than moral agents
on the grounds that such an argument would require,
inter alia, reliance on perfectionist notions such as
intellect or artistic ability, etc. 30
The problem is that even if the lifeboat example is
the only or the primary example of the "exceptional"
case, it still represents a form of perfectionism. If, for
example, all cases were lifeboat (or otherwise
"exceptional") cases, and all of these exceptional cases
involved normal, healthy humans and normal, healthy
dogs, then the prescription for resolving those cases
would require that we regard the harm to the dogs as
incomparable with the harm suffered by the humans
because of a supposed excellence enjoyed by the latter
to a greater degree: humans have a qualitatively greater
opportunity for satisfaction that is foreclosed by action
that is detrimental to them.
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The third problem involved in using comparable-harm
analysis involves delineating those circumstances in
which the analysis will apply. Although Regan talks of
"exceptional" circumstances, it appears as though the
miniride and worse-off principles are intended to be
principles to resolve conflict as a general matter. And,
in morality, conflict is the rule and not the exception.
To the extent, then, that comparable-harm analysis is
to be applied in any situation of conflict between or
among rightholders, then the result in the lifeboat
situation portends difficulties for an animal rights
theory. The use of a putative human excellence to justify
the killing of the dog in the lifeboat example opens
the door to perfectionist ethical theory in that any such
consideration, it seems, detracts from the notion of equal
inherent value, which rests, at least in part,. on the notion
that possession of inherent value depends only on the
status of the individual as a subject-of-a-life with
consciousness, complex awareness, and a psychophysical identity over time. To the extent that we
regard harms to normal, healthy rightholders as
incomparable, we depart from the presumption that
Regan establishes that we should assume that like
harms have like effects on rightholders.
Even if, however, the comparable-harm analysis
applies only to truly "exceptional" cases, it is difficult
to know exactly what cases are covered. For example,
Sapontzis argues that it is improper to use animals in
medical experiments except when animal use (and
perhaps the use of comatose or terminally ill humans)
is "necessary for and greatly outweighed by some clear
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and present, massive, desperately needed good."31
How close is this situation to the lifeboat example?
Does it qualify as an "exceptional" case? If so, it would
seem that even a rights advocate could justify using
animals (or "marginal" humans) based on the differential "excellence" possessed by normal humans whose
use for the purpose would foreclose more opportunities
for satisfaction.
The preceding discussion indicates that a reliance
on comparable-harm analysis is problematic not only
because it may entail speciesist conclusions. Let us
return to the lifeboat. There are five survivors-all
human. Four of the survivors possess some sort of
extraordinary talent---one is a gifted musician, one a
genius mathematician, etc. The fifth survivor is a
normal, healthy adult who works at a minimum wage
job and possesses no special skill or talent. If we can
depart from the assumption that like harms have like
effects when the fifth passenger is a dog, why not
assume that the like harm of death will have a different
impact on the four talented survivors than it will on the
fifth untalented survivor because death for the former
will foreclose opportunities for satisfaction in a way
that it will not for the latter?

membership in this class, it is necessary that we
recognize the basic right of animals not to be treated
as property, or, as Regan puts it, not to be treated
exclusively as means to human ends.
Although the notions of "basic" and "absolute"
rights are discussed in much philosophical literature,
its most lucid presentation for present purposes may be
found in the analysis presented by Professor Henry Shue
in his book, Basic Rights. 32 According to Shue, a basic
right is not a right that is "more valuable or intrinsically
more satisfying to enjoy than some other rights."33
Rather, a right is a basic right when "any attempt to
enjoy any other right by sacrificing the basic right would
be quite literally self-defeating, cutting the ground from
beneath itself." Shue states that "non-basic rights may
be sacrificed, if necessary, in order to secure the basic
right. But the protection of a basic right may not be
sacrificed in order to secure the enjoyment of a nonbasic right." The reason for this is that a basic right
"cannot be sacrificed successfully. If the right sacrificed
is indeed basic, then no right for which it might be
sacrificed can actually be enjoyed in the absence of the
basic right. The sacrifice would prove self-defeating."
Shue emphasizes that basic rights are a prerequisite to
the enjoyment and exercise of non-basic rights, and that
the possession of non-basic rights in the absence ofbasic
rights is nothing more than the possession of rights "in
some merely legalistic or otherwise abstract sense
compatible with being unable to make any use of the
substance of the right."34
In order for animals to enjoy any rights at all, it is
first necessary that they stop being regarded as "things"
which, as a matter of law and (some) moral theories,
cannot have rights. For example, the law regards
animals as property, and "legal relations in our law exist
only between persons. There cannot be a legal relation
between a person and a thing or between two things."35
Property "cannot have rights or duties or be bound by
or recognize rules."36 Regan's enterprise may be
understood as an argument in favor of the single, basic
right not to be regarded as property. Aright to be treated
as a moral and legal person is perhaps the most basic
right in that personhood is a necessary condition of
having relations at all in any normative system that
distinguishes between persons and things.
Regan's theory of animal rights is similar to
theories about the abolition of human slavery, which
concerned the basic right of human beings not to be
regarded as the property of others. Those who opposed

''Exceptional'' Circumstances and Basic Rights

There is, however, an important sense in which the real
difficulty with the lifeboat example is that Regan
mentions it at all. Although Regan thought that his
general theory of animal rights provided an answer for
the lifeboat situation, he may have made the mistake of
confusing a question concerning the rights that animals
would have in a situation in which animal rightholders
had a conflict with human rightholders with a general
theory that concerned only the question of whether
animals had a single right not to be treated solely as
means to ends.
It is my view that Regan never intended The Case
for Animal Rights as an exhaustive analysis of every
issue-including how to resolve conflicts between
rightholders-that flowed from the recognition that
animals have rights. Regan's primary focus was on
the violation of animal rights through their treatment
solely as means to human ends in institutionalized
exploitation represented by factory farming, vivisection, and animal use for clothing and entertainment.
That is, Regan argued that animals ought to be included
in the class of rightholders, and that in order for
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slavery argued that it was morally wrong to treat
human beings exclusively as means to the ends of other
humans. But the abolitionist position did not entail
what particular rights would be possessed by the
liberated slaves-{)ther than the basic right not to be
regarded as property. Regan is concerned about
institutionalized animal exploitation, and it is this
concern that led him to reject "routine" subordination
and to use of the miniride and worse-off principles in
only "exceptional" circumstances.
An important part of Regan's theory is that all
forms of institutionalized exploitation of animals
violate the respect and harm principles because they
fail to treat individuals as possessing equal inherent
value, and rely on some form of utilitarian or
perfectionist thought. For example, a slave owner
could not rely on the worse-off or miniride principles
to complain ofharm when a slave was liberated against
the owner's will. In this sense, then, Regan might have
a way of distinguishing exceptional or extraordinary
cases from most others in that some involve institutionalized animal exploitation that Regan would argue is
from the outset violative of animal rights. Regan's
theory would conceptually prevent there being a
conflict from the outset in such situations. Regan could
argue consistently that rights theory conceptually
prevents our making any sort of comparable-harm
determination in the context of animal use (or the use
of "defective" humans) to find a cure for the most
serious epidemic. Such animal use would entail
institutions that are inherently exploitative of animals
because they regard animals solely as means to human
ends. This option is not open to Singer, who, if he is
to be consistent, must inquire as to whether any
exploitation-institutionalized or not-is justified by
the principle of utility. For Singer, all cases are lifeboat
cases. For Regan, exceptional cases exclude the
institutionalized treatment of rightholders solely as
means to the ends of others.
If this interpretation of Regan is correct, then two
things are now clear. First, it was wholly unnecessary
for Regan even to discuss the lifeboat example.
Regan applies the miniride and worse-off principles
to the lifeboat example, which, by Regan's own and
explicit account, indiCates that we are dealing with a
situation in which there is no institutionalized
exploitation operative, so the case does not concern
the matter that is the primary subject of Regan's
analysis. Regan's resolution of the lifeboat example
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is not required by his overall theory because the
lifeboat example concerns a very different contextthe resolution of a conflict between two rightholdersfrom the one that occupies Regan's attention
throughout The Case for Animal Rights-the inclusion
of nonhumans in the class of rightholders. Regan
thought that his general theory provided an answer to
the lifeboat situation, and this may have resulted from
confusing issues concerning conflicts between
rightholders with issues concerning membership in the
class of potential rightholders.
Second, to the extent that Regan's (unnecessary)
resolution of the problem requires the use of some
form of perfectionism, such a requirement is
problematic for Regan's overall theory, but not for the
reasons pointed to by his critics. Regan could say that
although all beings with inherent value possess that
value equally for purposes of not treating any being
exclusively as a means to an end in institutionalized
exploitation, these beings do not possess the same
value for purposes of resolving conflicts between
rightholders. This reflects our intuition that it may be
permissible to award Mary a scholarship if she is better
in math than Johnny, but that it is not permissible to
enslave Johnny for Mary's use simply because he is
less intelligent than she.
The problem is that in light of Regan's analysis of
the lifeboat example, it would seem that he is committed
to resolving virtually every human/animal conflict in
favor of the human. This does not, as some have
suggested, mean that he is on a slippery slope back to
vivisection. On the contrary, Regan can claim that the
respect principle is always violated in cases of institutionalized exploitation. But it does give nonhumans a
somewhat pyrrhic victory. Animals may no longer be
regarded as property, but their interests will nevertheless
not prevail most of the time because the characteristics
upon which we relied to justify their property status
will now be used to resolve any conflict that they may
have as rightholders with a human rightholder.
Once animals are no longer treated as property, then
it will become necessary to determine what particular
rights are or should be possessed by animals. At this
juncture, it may be permissible to take the presence or
absence of certain virtues to resolve conflicts between
or among rightholders. It is, however, problematic to
say that rights theory requires that we throw the dogor a million dogs-{)verboard, just as it would be
problematic to say that a human rights theory about the
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Conclusion

abolition of human slavery requires that we always
throw overboard the human with the least intelligence.
Perfectionism in the context of deciding issues or
conflicts involving at least basic rights raises serious
problems for any theory that rests on a notion of radical
equality. My ability to do mathematics may legitimately
be used to decide whether I get a math scholarship; that
ability is irrelevant to whether, in a situation of famine,
I should get the one remaining crust of bread. Respect
for my basic or fundamental rights (however understood) should not, on a radical egalitarian view, depend
on my virtues, which are, in any event, out of my control
for the most part. To the extent that Regan links even
basic rights (other than the right not to be property)
with the possession of certain "virtues," he allows for
differential consideration of equal inherent value. Such
differential consideration would not justify using
animals in experiments or otherwise relegating them
to property status, but it might very well mean that
animals will continue to lose in virtually every
situation in which their "rights" were found to conflict
with those of humans.
In order for Regan to escape this difficulty, he needs
a theory about basic rights other than the right not to be
property. Once individuals are determined to possess
equal inherent value, then any conflict involving basic
or fundamental rights ought to be decided without
reference to any particular "virtue," which is what
comparable harm analysis prescribes. 37 Alternatively,
Regan needs a theory about why the basic right not to
be property is different from other basic rights. Regan
would have to defend the notion that the harm of being
treated exclusively as a means to an end is somehow
different in a morally significant way from the harm of
being deprived of other basic rights. One possible
option is for Regan to argue that the right not to be
property is the most basic of all rights because as long
as a being is characterized as property, that being will
be unable to enjoy those other rights as protected
interests if virtually all interests are considered as
tradable. 'The problem is that Regan never addressed
this issue and never explicitly recognized that his theory
was more about the abolition of animal slavery than a
general theory of rights that animals would possess once
they were no longer regarded as human property.
Moreover, it is not clear that such a difference would
be significant morally in comparison to deprivation of
other basic rights, such as a minimal right of physical
security or minimal subsistence.
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In sum, the observation that Singer, Carruthers, and
others have made of Regan's theory-that the lifeboat
example sinks, as it were, the whole theory because it
allows for a necessary compromise of the categorical
nature of Regan's concepts of equal inherent value and
subject-of-a-life---is incorrect. Regan's overall rigbts
theory is not threatened by his compromise of his
categorical concepts as long as the "exceptional"
circumstances in which this compromise can occur are
limited to those that are identified exclusively by
reference to those categorical concepts. That is,
"exceptional" circumstances can never include institutionalized exploitation so, irrespective of the emergency,
such as a plague, performing animal experiments (a
form of institutionalized exploitation) would always be
deemed to violate the respect principle. Regan can retain
comparable-harm analysis, but he cannot, it seems,
accept any sort of "perfectionism," even in the
exceptional case, insofar as basic rights are concerned.
Regan's resolution of the lifeboat example was
unnecessary because it did not concern the general
context of his theory, which involved only the basic
right not to be treated exclusively as a means to an end.
The lifeboat example concerns a conflict between
rightholders. To the extent that in such situations Regan
would require choosing the human interest over the
animal interest, it is problematic for his theory because
it would mean that animals, although no longer
property, will virtually never prevail in any conflict with
human rightholders. 38
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